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Circuit Judge Murrah Will Address Graduates l 
An honorary degree of Doctor of Laws will be bestowed on Chief 
Justice Alfred P. Murrah of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit when he addresses William Mitchell's graduating seniors and their 
gue t at the annual commencement exercises. The ommencement will 
be lield at the Coll ge of t. Thom Armory on Tu day June 15, at 
; 00 p.m. when the 7Q ca.ndida.tes will be escorted from the law chool 
lo the Armory by eiaht marshal] elected from the top student of U1e 
junior clas . 
.Judge Munah, a native of Indian Territory (now Oklal1oma) re-
ceived hi LL.B. at the University of Oklahoma in 1928, where he was 
Phi Beta Kappa and Order of the Coif. He was also a member of Lambda 
Chi Alpha Fraternity, and of Phi Alpha Delta legal fraternity, of which 
h was - uprcrne Ju tice from 1962 to 1964. 
He engaged in general practice in ' rninole Oklahoma, and in kla-
l1oma City until he w appointed to the U. . District Court for tbe 
ta te of Oklahoma in l9S7. At aae 3~, he was then the youngest 1J . . 
Di trict ,Tud"'e ever to be appointed. In 19-lO, he -was clevat <l to Lhe 
. ~. Cout of App als for the Tenth Circuit and in 1959 he became 
hi f Judge. 
Judge Murrah has b en very active in civic, church and community 
affair. He wa,s a Yi iting profei ~or of la," at the U11iver ity of Oklalioma 
and at Colorado Unive1 ity, Commi ~ioner of Last Frontier Couucil of 




for djstinguished :,ervice to boyhood; chairman of the O.klahomiL it ' 
n ited Fund ancl Red Cross from 194 throurn 1954; ha taught ~un -
da.y ·cbool cla se ince 1940; and has been active in local traffic safety 
work and in e 0 tablishi:ng a court for traffi.e offender~ in Oklahoma City 
which has become a model for other cities to follow. 
Th J udge has a great interest in safety, having served as chairman 
of the _ "ational Committee for Traffic Safety for three years and partici-
pated in safety conferences and institutes in all parts of the nation. He is 
also chairman of the Advisory Council of Judges of the National Council 
on Crime and Delinquenc~T 
He has also been active in the ABA, being past chairman of the 
Judicin.1 ction and member of the House of Delegates, and in the 
American JudjcaLure ocicty and the American Law I,rtitute. But with 
all these activitie , Judue l\Iurrah ~ ma.in. interest ha been. in improving 
the admin istration of j1J ticc. A. chairman of the ~ ationaJ Judicial Cou-
£ercnce Pr>trial ommittee ince 1948, he has work d tire] · ly to edu-
cate the bench and bar to the correct and practical uses of these 
procedures through seminars, clinics, demonstrations, etc. in practically 
every stat . 
In l9:5J . he wa awarded th Di ·tinguish d -ervice Citation by the 
Uninr ity of Oklahoma for ot1l 'ta11ding n •ic to the state and the 
nation. and al ' o U1 Hattan W. umners Award for outstandina service 
(Continued on page 2) 
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ALSA Offers 
Student Loans 
Augmenting a $50,000 guaranty 
fund established last semester in co-
operation with the First National 
Bank of St. Paul to provide loans 
to cover the cost of tuition and 
books for Mitchell students, the 
American Law Student Association 
(ALSA) has recently created the 
Fund for Legal Education, consid-
ered a major stride in aiding more 
law students to finance a legal edu-
cation. 
Beginning in January, 1965 the 
ALSA's Fund enables all students 
at American Bar Association ap-
proved law schools to apply for 
loans after completion of one full 
year of law study with satisfactory 
standing. These loans are available 
to the extent of the school's alloca-
tion and will be for a maximum of 
$1 ,000.00 per year. The minimum 
loan amount is $400.00. Borrowers 
will sign interim notes accruing sim-
ple interest which will be deferred 
while the note-maker remains a stu-
dent in good standing. Arrange-
ments may be made for one of sev-
eral repayment plans. 
Students interested in applying 
for an ALSA loan should secure full 
information from the Dean. 
Trustees Appoint-
Han oo, Kcllt Phleger & Mulligan -
Capitol Bound. (See Moot Court, p. S) 
Heidenreich to Per1nanent Dean 
D ouglas R. Heidenreich, A.cting Dean of the Col-
lege since July 1, 1904, recei\•ed a permanent appoint-. 
ment o the deanship from the Colleae' Board of 
Trustees on Feb. 23, 1965. 
Dean Heidenreich, age 33, resides at 1237 Lake-
view Avenue, Minneapolis. He stated that the ap-
pointment has mefill t little change in his duties, since 
he was already the school's chief administrative offi-
cer in his acting status. Graduated magna cum laude 
from William Mitchell in 1961, Dean Heidenreich en-
gaged in private practice until his appointment as 
Assistant Dean o"n March l, 1963. 
The new dean declined to outline any plans for 
major change . "I have naturally been giving consid-
erable thought to many areas," he commented. "As 
yet, however, _it is impossible to know where any 
chang might be made." 
Job placement bn:s been of some concern to both 
him and the students, be said. "We do plan to find 
out from upper classmen what kinds of opportunities 
interest them. Even now, we know very little about 
the positions our students are seeking." 
Dean Heidenreich also plans to inform third-year 
students about the necessity for making early appli-
cations for po itions with law furn . This plan results 
in part from a poll of the senior which indicated that 
at the tart of their final "em _ter very few of them 
had made arra:ngcmeuts for a job upon graduation. 
• nother long-range o-oal is a comprehensi,·e cur-
r iculum revie"-· "We w0uld like to make mor elec-
tives available to lower classmen," the dean said. "Our 
seniors have had some choice of courses this year, but 
we'd like to extend this option to the other classes." 
The new orporations prof orship created by a 
Hill Foundation grant has also taken much of th 
deans attention. He predicted that the full-time po 
would be filled within a short time, possibly before the 
end of the school year. 
Debt on Building 
Nearly Paid Off 
By Dave Planting 
The .m rt_ga"e debt on William 1\IitcbeTl"s seven-year-old building has 
been virh1nll)' wiped out. An am.bitiou · drive launched la. t May raised 
$149,000, leaving a b1tlance oI only a f w hundred dollar on Lhe debt. 
The funds were donated by 138 alumni, corporations, foundations, 
law firms and other friends of the school. 
Two contributions exceeded $10,000. They were donated by the 
Margaret H. and James E. Kelley "Foundation, Inc., and West Publish-
ing Co. Mr. Kelle_ ·, a ,, illia:m }1itchell alumnus, is a member of the 
St. Paul law firm of Bundlie. Kell ~' & Torrison. 
The mortgage debt originally was $225,000. Income payments and 
several miscellaneous contributions had reduced it to nearly $149,000 by 
the time the drive began la t spring. 
Tlte 15-year mortgage was held by .Minnesota Federal avings and 
Loan. D eru1 Douglas H eidenreich said ifinnesota Federal aved the 
chool about $5.000 by a reduc d intere t .rate and by waiving penalties 
for prepayments. 
Without the donations, the college would have been paying on the 
mortgage for the next nine years. 
A total of $64,000 in donations was received by William Mitchell 
since the last issue of the Opinion was published in December. 
"There really aren't words to ex-
press fully the college'- deep grati-
tude for the tremendous effort and 
success of the drive," commented 
Dean Heidenreich. "William Mitch-
ell indeed can be as proud as it is 
fortunate to have so many loyal and 
generous friends." 
The drive was headed by former 
Minnesota Supreme Court Justice 
Roger L. Dell. Active in soliciting 
contributions were Harry Holtz, a 
1943 alumnus and president of the 
First Trust Co., St. Paul; Charles 
Murnane, a 1937 alumnus and presi-
dent of the Minnesota State Bar 
Association; and Lee Slater, presi-
dent of West Publishing Co. 
Other alumni who aided in the 
drive were attorneys Harold J . Car-
roll, a 1923 alumnus and partner in 
the Minneapolis firm of Carroll, 
Cronan, Roth & Austin; Burr B. 
Markham, a 1941 graduate, part-
ner in Meagher, Geer, Markham & 
Anderson, also Minneapolis; and 
Richard E. Klein, class of 1949, St. 
Paul. Prominent among numerous 
out-of-town workers were Clem 
Ryan, Brainerd, class of 1920, and 
Leo Seifert, a Fairmont attorney 
and 1916 graduate. 
Donors to date are listed on 
page 6. 
10 Law Students 
Get Scholarships 
Scholarships totaling $2,900 were 
awarded to 10 William Mitchell stu-
dents on March 4. 
They are Robert Rahn, Ronald 
Johnson and Frank O'Meara, fourth 
year students; Richard Knutson, 
Robert Halva and Joseph Flynn, 
third year students; and Ronald 
Erickson, Fred Keiser, Bruce Ander-
son and Clifford Gardner, second 
year students. 
The scholarship funds were do-
nated by the P. W. Skogmo Foun-
dation, Minnesota Mutual Founda~ 
tion, Minnesota State Bar Founda-
tion, Farmers Insurance Group, Wil-
liam Mitchell Law Wives, and vari-
ous law firms and corporations. 
Scholarships were awarded on the 
basis of scholastic performance and 
financial need . 
Dean H~i(lenreich said that in the 
future, an attempt will be made to 
raise scholarship funds during the 
summer, rather than during the first 
semester. Grants would then be 
made at the beginning of each aca-
demic year. 
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EDITORIAL: 
Freedom and the Fourth Estate 
There'll be IIO queuina at the te for vou this ummer if vou're a 
lawyer whose client is hapl enough to ~ome under the gaz; of the 
c°:11-p:ting news media to any marked degree. Even if hi plight · con-
c1cnt.iously reported you'll fin.cl your elf at the eye of an old but never 
more active maeslstrom: How to balance the fundamental and constitu-
tionally protected rights of fair trial and free press. 
The Oswald debacle ba accentuated the _problem for the public, al-
though it ha Jong concerned re..._sponsible leader in the legal and jou:rnali 
t ic profe sion . Harvard Law· School Dean. Erwin Griswold for example 
ha~ publicly declared that O wald was 'convicted" in new paper and on 
IT creen and ·ould never ha e had a fair trial anywhere in America. 
With pa t sifted tln-ouah, pro ecutors .interviewed and guilt as-
sUIDed, numerous defend.ll.Ilts of a more conventional character hav e faced 
juries fatally prejudiced at the hand of the Fouth Estate. Is it hyperbole 
to say that slowly becoming engrained in Our Way of Life is the terrible 
and unwhispered principle that the fair administration of criminal and 
civil justice takes a close second place to the public's taste for the morbid 
and thirst for the facts? 
A dialogue between the professions of journalism and the law has 
gone on for over seventy years, each side often appearing more interested 
in ascribing blame than in finding a solution. Joint attempts made in 
19 5. "1937. and 1953 to draft a voluntary code all ca.me to naught. To-
day, numerou law-pres. eminar are in es ion in many states and the 
A oci.ation of American Law chool 11a ct up an advi o:ry committee 
of experts to help explain . uprcme Court opinions to the working 
pre s. In the meantime, the Federal Communications Commission has no 
rules or regulations controJJing abuses in this area, and is in fact expressly 
prohibited from exercising the power of censorship over broadcast ma-
terial. The N atio11.al Association of Broadcasters sponsors a voluntary 
code of good practices for the television industry, but its standards are 
broad and no attempt has been made to deal with the problem directly. 
Talk of legislation in this area aives journali ts spa-vin and jurists 
chills. Justice Bernard Meyer of the New York upreme Court, however . 
ha- everal times uggesled that it may not be uncon titutional to adopt 
a latute re tricting pres handling of criminal new~ to in ure a fafr 
trial. Reasons Justice Meyer: To state the conflict between fair trial 
requiTemen and free p ress protection is to acknowledge that both 
cannot be absolute rights. He concludes that 'neither righL is ab olute, 
that the intere · on both sides must be balanced and that the conclusion 
of any balancing based on reason must be that to the extent necessary 
to protect the individuals' right to fair trial, specific limitations of the 
free press right are constitutionally permissible." 
A spokesman for the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Her-
bert Bruc.ke. disagree . The p res. onn publish anything it wishe , he con-
t nds, ubject onl to the penalty for libel. A.t the end of the pcctrum is 
J"u tice Hugo Black, who has bint d that in hi_ opinion even the law of 
libel might be held to be an unconstitutional abridgment of the freedom 
of the press. 
Frank tanton P rej dent of CBS, thinks a tatute specifying what 
c_annot be published or broadcast i "a tempting pro pect becau e it ap-
pears swift and _weeping. ' E ve-n if con titutional however (and there 
seems to be little question that an effective constitutional statute can be 
dmfted) ucb a statute in Mr. Stanton's eyes would generate far more 
critical problem··, such as imposing upon the courts the problem of 
policing the -pre s. 
While talk goes on in every quarter, the "clear and present danger" 
principal enunciated by Holmes in Schenck v. United States (together 
with contempt and libel remedies) continues to offer our only guidelines 
for curbing abuses by the press. There are, of course, a number of 
available correctives-postponement of trial, change of venue, waiver of 
jury, jury lock-ups, voir dire questioning of jury candidates, or standing 
trial and seeking reversal later. Some of these proposals are solutions 
after the event, or limited rights; most are costly and circuitous; all are 
abdications of the problem and poor substitutes for a preventive remedy. 
Suppression externally imposed on one class as a means of guaranteeing 
or amplifying constitutional rights of another is no new notion in Ameri-
can law. The alternative-intra-professional regulation self-imposed by 
the professions-is obvious and preferable. 
In the fifty-odd years that Canon 20 of the Canons of Professional 
Ethics ("Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated 
litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the courts and otherwise 
prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they are to be 
condemned ... ") has existed, there hasn't been one reported proceeding 
against an offending lawyer, prosecutor or judge. 
Neither has the press in the past shown any great altruism or eager-
ness to abandon its role as money maker, although its avowed function 
in doing so is to keep a democratic people informed for decision making. 
Ironically, it is often the aptness, latitude and mobility of the press 
in pursuit of the public weal which now demands restraint and cure . 
The need for reconciliation of these competing principles of journal-
istic freedom and the proper administration of justice has never been 
more compelling. Unless the press and the bar can voluntarily achieve 
effective policing of their respective professions, it is not unreasonable 
to expect definite legislative standards appearing as embodiment of what 
are today merely murmurs in the outposts. J.E.C. 
Judge Murrah . 
(Continued from page 1) 
in the administration of justice in 
the southwest. In 1957 he was hon-
ored by the National Conference of 
Christians and Jews of Oklahoma, 
and in 1959 was chosen for induc-
tion into the Oklahoma Hall of 
Fame. He is also a member of the 
board of trustees of Southern 
Methodist University. 
Preceeding the graduation, on 
Friday evening, June 11 at 8: 00 
p.m., the seniors and their wives 
and parents will be entertained at 
the traditional Senior Class Party, 
at which time wives or mothers of 
the seniors will be presented with 
appropriate letters of appreciation 
recognizing their part in sustaining 
the candidates during four difficult 
years of study. Minnesota Supreme 
Court Justice Tom Gallagher, father 
of graduating senior Michael J. Gal-




bers of the 1965 
graduating class 
are: Donald L. 
Andersen, Min-
neapolis; Allan 
S. Anderson , 
Minneapolis; 
Jerome T. An-
derson, St. Paul; 
Oliver F. Arrett , 
Bloomington; 
Larry D. Bue-
gler, St. Paul; Robert S. Burke, St. 
Paul; Asa E. Buttrick, White Bear 
Lake; Carolyn A. Cochrane, St . 
Paul; Robert F. Collins, South St. 
Paul; Lawrence R. Commers, Min-
neapolis. 
Emmett D. Dowdal, St. Paul; 
Eleanor M. Earle, St. Paul; Ron-
ald C. Evans, St. Paul; Alan W. 
Falconer, Richfield; Leo J. Fogarty, 
St. Paul; Thomas W. Foley, Minne-
apolis; Michael J. Gallagher, Min-
neapolis; Richard J. Grass, St. Paul; 
Robert W. Gyurci, St. Paul; Charles 
R. Hall, New Brighton; Samuel L. 
Hanson, St. Paul; Gene F. Happe, 
Minneapolis; Michael J. Healey, St. 
Paul; Donald J. Heffernan, St. Paul; 
Adrian E. Herbst, Richfield; John 
R . Holte, Minneapolis. 
Clark F. Isaacs, St. Paul; Ronald 
F. Johnson, St. Paul; Errol K. Kan-
tor, Minneapolis; John F. Kelly, St. 
Paul; William D. Kenyon, North St. 
Paul; Joseph A. Klimek, Blooming-
ton; Thomas R. Lacy, Bloomington; 
Robert E. Larson, Anoka; Fred R. 
Long, St. Paul; John E. McKen-
drick, Edina; Thomas J. McLeod, 
St. Paul; James M. Mahoney, St. 
Paul; William F. Messerli, Minne-
apolis; Dennis J. Morgeson, Edina; 
Allan E. Mulligan, St. Louis Park; 
Thomas W. Murray, St. Paul. 
Louis E. Navin, St. Paul; Dewey 
M. Nelson, Minneapolis; Frank J . 
O'Meara, St. Paul; Patrick H. O'-
Neill, St. Paul; John A. Page, Crys-
tal; Gerald W. Pahl, West St. Paul; 
Philip R. Perkins, St. Paul; Barry L. 
Peterson, Minneapolis; David L. 
Peterson, St. Paul; Merwin W. Pet-
erson, Minneapolis; Richard Petrow-
ski, Minneapolis; Gary L. Phleger, 
St. Louis Park; Charles H. Potter, 
Minneapolis; William H. Queenan, 
St. Paul; Robert W. Rahn, Edina; 
Alvin J. Remmenga, Minneapolis; 
Russell T. Roe, Edina; Robert J . 
Schaefer, Richfield; Carl W. Schoch, 
St. Paul; Arthur W. Seaberg, St. 
Paul; Donald R. Sjostrom, Minne-
apolis; Douglas W. Snyder, Minne-
apolis; Emory A. Solie, Fridley; 
Richard R. Solie, Minneapolis; Fred-
erick W. Spencer, Minneapolis; 
David A. Streed, Minneapolis; Leon-
ard T. Street, St. Paul; James R. 
Stuart, St. Paul; William 0. White, 
Minneapolis; and Ronald E. Wills, 
St. Paul. 
ZJteta I I I 
BY THE DEAN 
We here at William Mitchell sometimes take for granted the tremen-
dous desire and enthusiasm and the extraordinary abilities of our stu-
dent . I review the lisl of the members of the 1965 graduating class, 
I realize they represent a tremendou wealth of talent energy, and am-
bition -..,~hic.h i about to beco~e a,ailable to the legal profession in the 
tate of finn ota. 
The 72 members of this class have a variety of backgrounds. Some en-
tered law schol right after college, although most of them had spent time 
in the service or working before beginning the study of law. All these 
men have a seriousness and singularity of purpose that has carried them 
through the trials of law school; they have seen others who started with 
them slacken their pace and finally wilt under the pressure of heavy 
assignments and a demanding academic schedule. The lazy, the slow, and 
the ill-prepared have long since fallen out of the race. 
The members of the class of 1965 have come from many parts of the 
state of Minnesota; they have attended many colleges at the undergradu-
ate level; they come from both urban and rural areas; they profess a 
variety of political philosophies and religious creeds. But they have cer-
tain things in common. 
Select at random any name from the list of 1965 graduates and vou 
will likely find that you have chosen a man who is approximately. 30 
years of age, who is married and who has a family. He has gone through 
law school under his own power, perhaps with the helping of a working 
wife or occasional scholarship funds. He is likely to be a man holding a 
responsible position with a Twin Cities corporation or perhaps an ad-
juster or accountant of some years experience. He may have great experi-
ence in the fields of taxation, labor relations, or patents. Almost certainly 
he will have a background of several years of business or employment 
experience in the community. He probably has his military training be-
hind him and he may have served in the Korean conflict. 
He is a man who has spent the past four years working the equiva-
l~nt of two full-time jobs. He has given up a great deal of his social life; 
his weekends have been spent in study and preparation for class. Per-
haps he has been beset at some time during the past four years by some 
personal problem, financial problem or illness. Nevertheless, the occasional 
discouraging set-backs only have served to strengthen his resolve and he 
has succeeded in solving his problem and overcoming his disadvantage. 
He has completed a program, the basic philosophy of which is that 
the evening law student must stand on his own feet, solve his own prob-
lems and meet the unbending demands of the law school curriculum. No 
concessions have been made to him during his course of study. If he was 
not a mature, thoughtful individual at the time that he entered law 
·chool he ha certainly become one during his four ears of training. 
H e will tcll you that he owes a _great debt to his wife. and family who 
have acrificed as much a he has. it.bou t their cooperation he· could 
not have ucceeded. He i a member of the elect group of 52% of the 
class which entered in 1961 wliich survive~ to graduate in J une 0£ 1965. 
He is now ready to step from law school into the legal profession. 
Some of these men will stay with their present employers; some will 
enter the active practice of law; still others will go into business. Many 
of those who practice law will seek jobs with Twin Cities firms but 
many will go to the suburbs or to rural areas. Some will practice with 
large firms, some with small firms, and some will work for corporations. 
Whatever they do, these men will bring with them a sincere love of the 
law and an overwhelming desire to succeed. 
The tremendous talent and demonstrated ability of these men offer to 
the legal profession and to the people of Minnesota a most valuable asset. 
These men have good reason to be proud of themselves. William Mitchell 
College of Law is proud of them! 
Five-year Survey Slietches 
Graduate Profile 
By Bill Glew 
What Mitchell grads are up to is 
a tale partly told by the following 
statistics. They're the result of a 
recent survey in which graduates of 
the last five years were questioned 
concerning their present location, 
type of employment and income! 
Approximately 40% responded . 
Replies were received from 49% of 
the class of 1960, 37% of each 
of the classes of 1961, 1962, 1963, 
and 41 % of the class of 1964 . 
Most graduates have remained in 
the Twin City area according to the 
survey. An average shows 71 % 
located in the Twin Cities, 21 % in 
other Minnesota communities, and 
8% in other states . 
The survey showed a definite pre-
ference for employment as a sole 
practitioner or with a small firm 
(five members or less). These two 
groups include 67 graduates or 46% 
of all those responding to the ques-
tionnaire. Of this number, 24 are 
practicing by themselves and 43 
are with small firms. 
Twenty-six graduates are employ-
ed by corporations, 15 by govern-
menl, 1.0 by medium size law firm 
(6-12 members) . and 1 by large 
la.w firm (13 or more members) . 
Four graduate~ are employed by 
a bank or tru t company and one is 
in militar y ervice. Fifteen gwdu-
a te ar in other nelds. 
The gra-duate of recent years re-
ported a lower propor tion of their 
cla.s, mployed with a small firm 
or a a sole practitioner than did 
ear]jer graduate· . The per cent in-
dicating employment in th e two 
categorjes was: Cla. - of 1964- S7% 
class of I 963-S9% class oi 1962-
49 % , cla.s of 1961- 5~%, cla- of 
1960-60% . 
Annual income ot between ::'10,-
000 an.cl ,, 15,000 was reported by 
32% of all graduat who replied to 
the questionnaire. 
Graduates were asked to .indicate 
income in one of the following five 
area : under 5,000· :5 000 to. 7 500; 
"i . .500 to 'J0,000· 10,000 to -'15-
000; and over 815,000. Th replies 
indicate a trend toward concenl:ra-
tion in th ·1.0,000 to 15,000 range. 
May, 1965 
By Ronald F. Johnson 
Between 1938 and 1943 there was 
an extension and redefinition of the 
personal rights protected by the 
first amendment. This change came 
about largely because of persistent 
resort to the courts by the religious 
sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses. 
During this period no fewer than 
thirty-one cases involving Jehovah's 
Witnesses were heard by the United 
States Supreme Court (with sixteen 
deciding decisions). Commenting on 
this wave of cases in March, 1944, 
a retired judge wrote: 
It is plain that present con-
stitutional guarantees of per-
sonal liberty, as authoritatively 
interpreted by the United States 
Supreme Court, are far broader 
than they were before the 
spring of 1938 ... 1 
Two of these cases contested the 
constitutional authority of a school 
board to expel from public elemen-
tary schools children of members of 
Jehovah's Witnesses whose religious 
belief led them to refuse to salute 
the flag of the United States and to 
recite the familiar "Pledge of Al-
legiance." In the Gobitis 2 case de-
cided in 1940, the Supreme Court 
upheld the expulsion of Jehovah's 
Witnesses children by the school 
board in Virginia. The court, speak-
ing by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 
weighed the personal rights of the 
children against the attempt by the 
school board to promote the national 
cohesion and unity regarded to be 
so essential to national security . Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter pointed out that 
the flag is the "symbol of national 
unity, transcending all internal dif-
ferences, however large, within the 
framework of the Constitution . ... " 
He stated, in substance, that this 
was a matter within legislative auth-
ority, and that bringing it into the 
judicial arena would, in effect, make 
the United States Supreme Court a 
school board for the nation. 
The second of the two cases 
clearly shows a great change from 
the original approach to this ques-
tion by th upreme Court, an ap-
proa.ch whlch was first ta.ken "-)uch 
be"IID during those year ·. The Gobi-
tis ca. e wa eA-pre sly OYettnled by 
West Virginia Board of Education 
v. Barnette.' Again pupils were ex-
pelled from chool for refusing to 
al uLe th~ flag. althm1oh they would 
stand duriua tlie ceremony. Their 
refu. al wa ba ed on their literal 
interpretation of Exodus, Chapter 
20, verses 4 and 5.4 
The Supreme Court held that the 
right of religiou freedom a-uaran-
teed bv the fir t amendmenl 6 were 
appli~ble to the action by t he 
tate through the 'due proces 
and 'equal protectio,n" clau of 
the fourte nth amendment. It was 
held that the attainment of na-
tional unity and security, although 
desirable "ends," could not be at-
tained at the expense of religious 
freedom. Mr. Justice Jackson point-
ed out that a limited government is 
not necessarily a weak government. 
He gave an indication of what the 
State's interest would have to be 
by stating: 
It is now commonplace that 
censorship or suppression of 
expression is tolerated by our 
constitution only when the ex-
pression presents a clear and 
present danger of action of a 
kind the state is empowered to 
prevent and punish. It would 
seem that involuntary affirma-
tion could be commanded only 
on even more immediate and 
urgent grounds than silence ... 
To sustain the compulsory 
:flag salute we are required to 
say that a Bill of Rights, which 
guards the individual's right to 
speak his own mind, left it 
open to public authorities to 
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terest of the government which 
clashed with the students' religious 
freedom was the furthering of "na-
tional unity" among young people 
in the time of war. This is certainly 
a valid and substantial governmen-
tal interest even if it is not sufficient-
ly strong to permit a violation of the 
pupils' constitutional rights. The de-
fendant school authorities contend-
ed in the Sheldon case that allowing 
plaintiffs not to conform would 
create a "disciplinary problem." 
This interest of the school author-
ities is certainly anemic when com-
pared with the national interest in 
time of war and is certainly not a 
substantial enough interest to out-
I weigh the rights guaranteed to the 
--------------- pupils by the first amendment. Thus 
compel him to utter what is 
not his mind. 
The practical effect of this case is 
that freedom of religion is protected 
similarly to freedom of speech which 
is also protected by the first amend-
ment. 
Almost exactly twenty years af-
ter publication of the Barnette case, 
the United States District Court 
in Arizona decided Sheldon v. Fan-
nin,1 a case with facts strikingly 
similar to the Barnette case. In the 
Sheldon case the statutes of Arizona 
provided that the state superin-
tendant of public education shall 
"prepare for use in the public schools 
a program providing for a salute to 
the flag and other patriotic exer-
cises, as meet the requirements of 
the different grades." 8 In com-
pliance with this statute and in con-
junction with their duty to provide 
a course in music, the defendant 
School Board and Arizona State 
Board of Education had prescribed 
that as a part of general school as-
semblies students shall be required 
to stand during the singing of the 
National Anthem. Their refusal to 
stand was based on the refusal of 
the ancient Hebrew children Shad-
rach, Meshack and Abendnego to 
obey the express orders of King 
Nebuchadnezzar to bow down at 
the sound of musical instruments 
playing patriotic-religious music in 
ancient Babylon.9 The plaintiffs 
were of compulsory school age and 
the school authorities expelled them 
solely for their refusal to stand dur-
ing the singing of the National An-
them. Their parents also faced pros-
ecution for the violation of Arizona's 
school laws. The plaintiffs sought 
and the Federal District Court 
awarded an injunction restraining 
the defendant school board from 
excluding the plaintiffs from attend-
ing school. 
The court held that there was no 
"establishment of religion" as the 
plaintiff had alleged. The court 
stated that the singing of the Na-
tional Anthem is primarily a patrio-
tic ceremony and any reference to 
religion is only incidental and mere-
the protected constitutional rights 
of the pupils are virtually identical 
in the Sheldon and Barnette cases. 
The only valid distinction is the 
interest of the government. Since 
the interest of the government set 
forth in the Barnette case is stronger 
than in the Sheldon case, the Shel-
don case is easily within the stand-
ards set by the Supreme Court in 
1943. 
Just how important must the in-
terest of the government be in order 
to permit the suppression of the 
right to "free exercise' of religion? 
That there are such vaild interests 
appears in an 1890 case involving a 
criminal prosecution for polygamy.n 
ly expressive of a religious faith Therein the Supreme Court upheld 
which is a historic fact. The deci- the conviction against the alleged 
sion was thus based solely on the defense that the defendant's reli-
"free exercise" clause of the first gious freedom was being violated by 
amendment. The court stated that stating: 
the sincerity or reasonableness of It was never intended or sup-
the claim that their refusal was posed that the Aniendm.ent 
based upon religious grounds "may should be invoked as a prohi-
not be examined by this or any bition against legislation for 
other court." 10 the punishment of acts inimi· 
Two principal factors distinguish cal to the peace, good order 
the Sheldon case from the Barnette and morals of society.12 
case. One is that in the Sheldon Recent decisions involving Sunday 
case the students were not required closing laws show that the Supreme 
to speak (or sing) but only to stand Court still thinks it is just to put 
during the time the National An- some restraint on an individual's 
them was being sung. It should not religious freedom.13 In Braunfeld v. 
matter if the act they are required Brown the petitioners were members 
to perform is singing, speaking or of the Orthodox Jewish faith and in 
merely standing silently. It is not accord with their religious beliefs 
the act itself but the fact that they kept their retail stores closed from 
are being compelled to do an act sun-down on Friday through sun-
contrary to their beliefs that en- down on Saturday. They made up 
croaches upon the "free exercise" of for the loss of business on their 
their religion. The other distinction /Sabbath by remaining open on Sun-
is that in the Barnette case the in- day. A Pennsylvania statute 14 en-
acted in 1959 made it a crime for 
them to remain open on Sunday. 
The storekeepers asserted that they 
did one-third of their weekly bus-
iness on Sunday and that they 
could not remain closed on both 
Saturday and Sunday and still re-
main in business. If they were to 
obey the statute they were put to 
the dilemma of forsaking either 
their livelihood or their religious 
dictates. Mr. Chief Justic Warren 
in writing the opinion of the Court 
called this an indirect burden on the 
"free exercise" of their religion 
which "does not make unlawful the 
religious practice itself." He sum-
med up the majority opinion by 
stating that the storekeeper's choice: 
• . • retaining their present 
occupations and incurring eco-
nomic disadvantage or engag-
ing in some other commercial 
activity which does not call for 
either Saturday or Sunday la· 
bor-may well result in some 
financial sacrifice in order to 
observe their religious beliefs, 
still the option is wholly differ-
ent than when the legislation 
attempts to make a religious 
practice itself unlawful." 
The dissent by Mr. Justice Bren-
nan quoted from the Barnette case. 
He felt that although the state had 
a legitimate basis for the statute 
that it was not sufficient to prevail 
against the weighty constitutional 
right. This was doubly so because 
he felt that Pennsylvania had an 
easy constitutional alternative (let-
ting those who worshiped on a day 
other than Sunday use that day as 
their day of rest and remain open 
on Sunday.) 
The main interest of the State 
in the Braunfeld case was to pro-
vide a day of rest. The rationale 
wa3 that the day of rest is best 
provided for by one uniform day 
when all commercial activity, ex-
cept that which is necessary, should 
come to a halt, thus creating as 
complete a reprieve as possible from 
the anxieties and fast pace of the 
working days of the week: 
The Braunfeld case did not, how-
ever, put a halt to the trend to-
ward an increased judicial recogni-
tion of the individuals' constitu-
tional rights. Sherbert v . Verner 
decided less than a year ago cuts 
deeply into the Court's reasoning 
in the Braunfeld decision. The Plain-
Page 3 
tiff was a member of the Seventh-
day Adventist faith and recognized 
Saturday as her day of worship. 
When her employer changed from a 
five to a six day week, requiring her 
to work on Saturday, she quit her 
job and applied for unemployment 
compensation benefits. The South 
Carolina Employment Security Com-
mission ruled that she was not qual-
ified for unemployment benefits be-
cause she failed, without good cause, 
to accept "suitable work when of-
fered ... by the employment of-
fice or the employer ... " In the 
Sherbert case as in the Braunfeld 
case, the citizen has to face the dif-
ficult choice between his religious 
beliefs and his livelihood. The 
"right" in each case is thus subs-
tantially the same. If the cases are 
to be distinguished it must be on 
the grounds that the public in-
terests set forth in the Braunfeld 
decision are substantially stronger 
than the policy considerations pres-
ented by the facts in the Sherbert 
case. The Braunfeld case involved 
the interest of the State to proclaim 
a uniform day of rest for all the 
citizens. But the Supreme Court de-
clares that the State in the Sherbert 
case could suggest: 
. . . no more than a possi-
bility that the filing of fraudu-
lent claims by unscrupulous 
claimants feigning religious ob-
jections to Saturday work 
might not only dilute the un.-
em p loym en t compensation 
fund but also hinder the sched-
uling by employers of neces-
sary Saturday work.17 
The Minnesota Supreme Court 
recently decided a case involving 
a different type of governmental 
interest.1" The petitioner in In re 
Jemson was a woman who refused 
to serve on a ,jury on religious 
grounds. Her refusal was based on 
her interpretation of the biblical 
passage, "judge not, that you will 
not be judged." For her refusal to 
serve the trial judge held her in 
contempt of court and sentenced 
her. The Supreme Court of Minne-
sota upheld the conviction, reason-
ing that the imposition on her re-
ligious freedom was slight when 
compared with her civic duty to 
serve on the jury. Jury service is 
certainly a substantial and neces-
sary interest of the government. 
Along with the rights and privileges 
given to the people, and limiting 
the power of the government, the 
people owe certain duties to the 
government. The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari 
and vacated the judgment of the 
Minnesota court "in light of" the 
Sherbert case which was decided af-
ter the Minnesota decision.19 
Thus the Supreme Court con-
cluded that in requiring jury serv-
ice that the interest of the State 
was not sufficient to warrant an in-
vasion of the woman's free exercise 
(Cont'd on p. 6, col. 4) 
1 Edward F. Waite, 28 Minn. L. Rev. 
209. 246. 
2 Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 
310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
a 319 U.S. 624. 
• " Thou shalt not make unto thee any 
;,raTcn image. or :l.JIY Ukeness of nny-
tbin,;r tha t I 1n heaven abov>i. or that fs 
In the earth beneath, o r that is ln the 
water under the earth; thou shalt not 
bow down thyself to them nor serve 
them." 
·s U.S. CONST. AMEND. I, "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof." 
• 319 U.S. 624. 633-34, 
7 Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 
(D. Ariz. 1963). 
s ARIZ. REV. STAT. No. 15-1031. 
• Dani.el 3 :13-28. 
10 221 F. Supp. 766, 771. 
11 Davis v. Benson, 13& U.S. 333 (1890). 
12 Id. at 342. 
1• Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 
(1961). Galla.gllcr v. Crown Kosher Mar-
ket, 366 U.S. ~90 (1961). 
14 18 Purdon's PA. STAT. ANN. (1960 
Cum. Supp.) No. 4699.10. 
15 Braunfeld v. Brown, supra note 13, 
at 606. 
1• Sherbert v . Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1903). 
1, Id. at 407. 
1 • In re Jenison, 120 N.W. 2d 515 
(Minn .. 1963). 
19In re Jenison, 84 S. Ct. 63 (1963) . 
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The Greatest Outlaw the West Has Ever Known ... 
By Alvin J. Remmenga 
Cursed by steamboat captains of 
the 1800s and later called "the 
greatest outlaw the West has ever 
known," 1 the Missouri River for 
decades has shown small respect for 
people or property lines. 
Its heyday was a century ago, 
when a $15,000 side-wheeler steam-
boat could earn $80,000 in a single 
trip to Montana with a load of pas-
sengers, chickens, and whisky-un-
less an underwater snag sank the 
whole outfit. But then the railroads 
and highways slithered across the 
nation, grabbed the freight trade, 
and the Missouri became an un-
wanted daughter of Nature, left to 
flip her muddy skirts about during 
her almost annual flooding spree. 
Her silt-laden waters earned her the 
title, "Big Muddy," and author 
Mark Twain once complained the 
river was "too wet to plow and too 
dry to drink." 2 
At "high tide"-as Omahans jok-
ingly called it during the 1952 flood 
-the Missouri's angTy waters some-
times churned for 20 miles or more 
across the boundary lines between 
Nebraska, Iowa, Missouri, and Kan-
sas. And where she finally settled 
down to rest, was not always where 
she had awakened. 
Today, an $11-billion network of 
dams and pilings has just about 
tamed the wild Missouri; but the 
courts and others are still picking 
up the pieces. And while another 
major flood on the river is unlikely, 
her wanderings have started what 
could be a major change in the tra-
ditional policy against permitting 
courts to act beyond their jurisdic-
tion.' 
Two recent court cases that 
stemmed from the bad behavior of 
the Missouri make it clear that tra-
ditional jurisdiction of land-that is, 
that only the courts of the state in 
which land is situated have the pow-
er to determine title to the land-is 
open to attack if the question is liti-
gated and the court decides it has 
jurisdiction. 
In one case, Duke v. Durfee; the 
river channel, the middle of which 
formed the Missouri- Nebraska 
boundary line, shifted so that about 
200 acres of land, once an island in 
the river, was on the Missouri side 
rather than the Nebraska side of 
the original boundary. Two Nebras-
ka citizens, one of whom was Dur-
fee and who claimed the land by 
virtue of a Nebraska sheriff's tax 
foreclosure deed, brought suit in 
1956 in the District Court of Rich-
ardson County, Nebraska, against 
a Missouri citizen, Duke, who claim-
ed the land through a Missouri 
swampland patent. 
Although Duke was not person-
ally within the jurisdiction of the 
Nebraska court, he appeared and a 
principle issue litigated was whether 
the shift in the rivers course resulted 
from avulsion-a rapid shift in the 
main channel-so that under Ne-
braska law the land remained a part 
of Nebraska, or from accretion, so 
that the land became a part of Mis-
souri. The Nebraska court found 
that the shift in the river's course 
resulted from avulsion, that it had 
jurisdiction of the parties-since 
Duke appeared in the action-and 
the subject matter, and that the 
land was in Nebraska. The court, 
therefore, quieted title in the Ne-
braska citizen. 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska 
affirmed, and the Missouri citizen-
Duke-did not appeal. Instead, he 
1 Duke v. Durkee, 215 F. Supp. 901, 
906 (W.D. Mo. 1961). 
• American Mercury, June 1960, p. 94. 
• Work Boat, Dec. 81, 1956, p. 57. 
• Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. 457 
(1874). See also Restatement. Judgments , 
10 (1942). "Where a court has jurlsdl<.~ 
tion over the parties and determines that 
it ha.s jurisdiction over the subject matter, 
the parties cannot collaterally attack the 
judgment on the ground that the court 
did not have jurisdiction over the subject 
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brought a similar action against the 
Nebraska citizens in a Missouri 
state court, from which it was re-
moved to the Missouri federal court . 
That court, although agreeing with 
Duke that the land was in Mis-
souri, dismissed the second suit on 
the ground that the Nebraska judg-
ment was res judicata and binding 
on the Missouri court.• 
The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit re-
versed, holding that the district 
court was not required to give full 
faith and credit 7 to the Nebraska 
judgment, that normal res judicata 
principles were not applicable be-
cause the controversy involved land, 
and that the Missouri court was free 
to retry the issue of the Nebraska 
court's jurisdiction over the subject 
matter.• 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court 
reversed." Joined by seven other 
members of the Court, Justice Stew-
art held that when the location of 
the land was fully and fairly liti-
gated and judicially determined by 
the Nebraska state courts, it could 
not be retired in another state in liti-
gation between the same parties. 
In the second case. Schroeder v . 
Land,10 the property in question was 
formerly on the west or Iowa side 
of the Missouri River, the original 
boundary line between Nebraska 
and Iowa. However, an eastward 
shift of the river caused the land to 
be on the west or Nebraska side, 
and the Iowa-Nebraska Boundary 
Compact of 1943 placed the land 
under Nebraska jurisdiction. 
Later, the federal government be-
gan proceedings to condemn the 
land for use in stabilizing the river 
channel and deposited $11,470 with 
the Nebraska federal district court 
pending determination of title in the 
land. 
John Schroeder, Roy M . Harrop, 
and the Homestead Corporation in-
tervened in the condemnation pro-
ceeding and asserted ownership of 
the land on the basis of tax deeds 
issued to them upon a 1952 judg-
ment of an Iowa state court, find-
ing them to be the owners. The 
opposing claimants, Ned and Irma 
Tyson, who were not parties to the 
Iowa suit, claimed title under a 1960 
judgment of the District Court of 
Washington County, Nebraska, re-
sulting from an attempt by Schroe-
der and Harrop to register and en-
force the 1952 Iowa judgment in 
Washington County.11 
The Nebraska federal court, how-
ever, found that the 1960 adjudica-
tion was conclusive and dispositive 
of the title issue and that the Ty-
sons were entitled to the money on 
deposit with the court.12 
That judgment was appealed to 
the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit, with the ap-
pellants admitting the land was on 
matter. unJ.e.· the polic~· underlying the 
doctrine of res judlcata is 0111:weii:hed bv 
the policy against permitting the. court to 
act beyond its jurisdiction." 
0 108 Neb. 2;2. 95 :-1 .'W .2d 01 ( l..959) . 
• 21.5 F . ugp . 001. Accord. Chicot Coun-
ty Dralnnge I bict , •. Baxter tote llank, 
30 U.S . 3,l. $7, (1 0~0 ). 
'U. . OIU!t. art. JV, 9. "Full FA1U1 
antl Credit 5hall be !"h•en to t.lrc public 
Act . Recor ds. and Judicial .P.roce.edlngs 
nf every other tale . .And Ute Con.:µ-e 
the Nebraska side of the 1943 sta-
bilized river channel but contending 
that the only authorized survey 
showed it to be in Iowa. The ap-
pellants also contended that the fed-
eral district court should have made 
collateral inquiry into the jurisdic-
tion of the Nebraska state courts 
because they failed to recognize the 
Iowa ratification act of the 1943 
compact, providing that titles good 
in Iowa should be good in Nebraska 
as to any lands Iowa might cede to 
Nebraska, and because the Nebras-
ka state courts failed to give full 
faith and credit to the 1952 Iowa 
state court judgment. 
In so arguing. the appellants re-
lied almost entirely upon the ruling 
of the Eighth Circuit court in Duke 
v . Durfee 13 that the Missouri fed-
eral court had the power to make 
collateral inquiry into the jurisdic-
tional basis of a Nebraska judgment 
that land in dispute was situated in 
Nebraska. 
The Court of Appeals, however, 
ruled in Schroeder that the judg-
ment of the Nebraska courts was 
conclusive on the question of own-
ership of the land and the federal 
district court was without the pow-
er to make collateral inquiry into 
the jurisdiction of the Nebraska 
state courts.14 The court did so on 
the ground that, unlike Duke, the 
parties attacking the jurisdiction of 
the Nebraska state courts were the 
same parties who originally in-
voked that jurisdiction and had had 
their day in court, and, even if that 
distinction was not present, the 1943 
boundary compact established that 
the land was in Nebraska. Para-
phrasing Pennoyer v . Nefj,15 the 
court added that every state pos-
sesses exclusive jurisdiction and 
sovereignty over property within its 
territory, and ·no state can exercise 
direct jurisdiction over property 
outside its territory. Therefore, the 
existing final judgment on the mer-
its, without fraud or collusion, by 
a court of competent jurisdiction is, 
under the doctrine of res judicata, 
conclusive of rights, questions, and 
facts in issue as to the parties in 
all other actions in the same or 
other judicial tribunal of concur-
rent jurisdiction. 
While there are significant differ-
ences in the fact situations of the 
Schroeder and Duke cases, the rul-
ings from the same circuit in the 
two cases appear a bit in opposi-
tion. The court in Duke showed lit-
tle hesitation in saying that the 
jurisdiction found by the Nebraska 
courts could be collaterally attack-
ed in the Missouri courts. Yet, in 
Schroeder, the court was equally 
forward in saying that the finding 
of Nebraska jurisdiction could not 
be collaterally attacked, and its rea-
soning that the Iowa parties had 
had their day in court is surprisely 
similar to Justice Stewart's later 
opinion in the Duke reversal. 
It is true that in Schroeder there 
was a boundary compact that 
placed the land in Nebraska, but 
the Eighth Circuit's opinion indi-
cates it would have come to the 
same conclusion even without the 
compact. Had the court in Schroe-
'der had the benefit of the Supreme 
Court's later opinion in Duke, it, of 
course, would have had no difficulty 
in reaching its result-boundary 
agreement or not and perhaps even 
if the compact had placed the land 
in Iowa. · 
Even so, the Court in Duke was 
careful to point out that nothing 
may by general Laws prescribe the Man-
ner in which such Acts, Record and Pro-
ceedings shall h!l proved, and the Effect 
thereof." This rule of the Constitution was 
extended to all courts, federal as well as 
state, by the Acts of June 25, 1948, ch. 
646, 62 Stat. 947. Aocord, Huron Holding 
Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co .• 312 
U.S. 183 (1941); United States v. Land. 
206 F. Supp. 322 (D. Neb. 1962); Gostin 
v. Nelson, 213 F. Supp. 164 (D. Del. 1962) . 
decided between the litigants could 
bind either Missouri or Nebraska 
with respect to any controversy 
they might have over the location 
of the boundary between them or 
as to their respective sovereignty 
over the land in question. Justice 
Black, in a concurring opinion, even 
urged that Duke should not be 
bound by the Nebraska judgment 
if the two states later determined 
the land was in Missouri. 
Do these two cases indicate that 
jurisdiction of land perhaps is los-
ing a bit of its sacred character, or 
will their holdings go down the river 
with the Missouri's floods? 
If history has a lesson, the result 
may be the former. The Supreme 
Court in Duke put it this way: 
; . . while it is established 
that a court in one State, when 
asked to give effect to the 
judgment of a court in another 
state, may constitutionally in-
quire into the foreign court's 
jurisdiction to render that 
judgment, the modern deci-
sions of this Court have care-
fully delineated the permissi-
ble scope of such an inquiry. 
From these decisions there 
emerges the general rule that 
a judgment is entitled to full 
faith and eredit--even as to 
questions of jurisdiction -
when the second court's in-
quiry discloses that those ques-
tions have been fully and fair-
ly litigated and finally decided 
in the court which rendered the 
original judgment.16 
With respect to jurisdiction over 
the person, this principle was force-
fully established in Baldwin v. Iowa 
State Travelling Men's Association.17 
There it was held that a federal 
court in Iowa must give binding ef-
fect to the judgment of a federal 
court in Missouri, despite the claim 
that the original court did not have 
jurisdiction over the defendants per-
son, once it was shown to the court 
in Iowa that the question had been 
fully litigated in the Missouri for-
um. 
Said Justice Roberts in that case: 
Public policy dictates that 
there be an end of litigation; 
that those who have contested 
an issue shall he bound by the 
result of the contest, and that 
matters once tried shall be 
considered forever settled as 
between parties. We see no rea-
son why this doctrine should 
not apply in every case where 
one voluntarily appears, pre-
sents his case and is fully 
heard, and why he should not 
in the absence of fraud, be 
thereafter concluded by the 
judgment of the tribunal to 
which he has submitted his 
cause.18 
Following the Baidwi,n case, the 
Supreme Court soon made it clear 
in a series of decisions-involving 
such things as divorce, personal 
property, and bankruptcy-that the 
general rule is no different when the 
claim is made that the original form 
did not have jurisdiction over the 
subject matter.1° In each of these 
cases the claim was made that a 
court, when asked to enforce the 
judgment of another forum, was 
free to retry the question of that 
forum's jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter. In each case the Su-
preme Court held that since the 
question of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion had been fully litigated in the 
original forum, the issue could not 
• Duke v. Durfee, 308 F.2d 209 (8th 
Cir. 1962). 
• Duke v. Durfee, 11 L .Ed.2d 186 (1963). 
10 318 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1963). 
11 Schroeder v. Homestead Corp., 171 
Neb. 792, 107 N.W.2d 750 (1961); Schroe-
der v. Williams, 868 U.S. 32 (1961). 
12 Schroeder v. Land, 206 F. Supp. 322 
(D. Neb. 1962). 
13 215 F. Supp. 901. 
u 318 F.2d 311 . 
rn 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
be tried in a subsequent action be-
tween the parties. In Treines v. 
Sunshine Mining Co.,,,,, the Court 
said flatly: 
One trial of an issue is 
enough. The principles of res 
judicata apply to questions of 
jurisdiction as well as to the 
other issues, as well to juris-
diction of the subject matter 
as of the parties.21 
Yet, the general rule under the 
full faith and credit clause that 
every state must give to a judg-
ment at least the res .judicata effect 
it would have in the state that ren-
dered it is not without exceptions. 
The Court in the Duke case care-
fully stated that the doctrine of 
federal pre-emption or sovereign 
immunity may sometimes override 
the conclusiveness of jurisdictional 
determinations. 
But should such immunity be 
given to land in all cases? Is it real-
ly so sacred and immovable-except 
at the hands of a force equal to the 
once-wild Missouri-as centuries of 
judicial interpretation have de-
clared? 
And does Minnesota really care, 
for example, whether the farm on 
the southwest corner of Shakopee is 
owned by a Minnesotan or a Ne-
braskan? It clearly does not be-
cause citizens of every state can 
and perhaps do own land in Min-
nesota. But does Minnesota really 
care whether the title to that farm 
is adjudicated in Nebraska or Min-
nesota? 
The question in each case is 
whether ther are sufficient grounds 
of public policy for denying to the 
determination of the court the ef-
fect of res judicata. Among the 
factors that may enter into the 
determination are: 22 
(1) Whether the lack of jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter 
is clear or doubtful. 
(2) Whether the determination 
as to the jurisdiction de-
pended upon questions of fact 
or of law. 
(3) Whether the court was one 
of general or of limited jur-
isdiction. 
(4) Whether the question of jur-
isdiction was actually liti-
gated. 
(5) The strength of the policy 
underlying the denial to the 
court of jurisdiction. 
This last factor-strength of the 
policy of undisturbed state juris-
diction over its own land-was the 
crucial question in the Duke case. 
It prompted Judge Blackmun's re-
versal in the Court of Appeals, 
where he said: 
. . . We are here concerned 
with judicial disposition of real 
estate and we are here con-
fronted with the traditional 
policy of imm.unity of a state's 
real property from direct dis-
position by a sister state's judg-
ment . . . It seems not mi-
reasonable or iinproper, there-
fore, as a matter of policy 
where land is concerned, to al-
low a court of the affected 
state the opportunity to satisfy 
itself as to the first forum's 
subject-matter jurisdiction.20 
In equally forceful terms, the 
other side of the argument was put 
forward by Circuit Judge Matthes 
in the Schroeder case: 
The doctrine (or res judi-
cata) is but a manifestation of 
the recognition that endless lit-
( Continued on page 5, col. 2) 
10 11 L .Ed.2d 186. 
1,288 U.S. 522 (1931). 1, Id. at- 525-526. 
,o Da,·I " · frJvi . 305 1:.S. :12 (1938) : 
toll ,·. Gottlieb. 305 t;.S. 10., (1938} ; 
1'rel.nles '"· ~unsl1ine , lining Co .• 808 tr . 
~6 (10-30 1 : Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U .. 
343 (1948). 
20 308 U.S. 66. 
21 Id. at 78. 
22 Restatement, Judgments, 10, comment 
b (1942). 
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PROFESSIONAL ATMOSPHERE . 
Moot Court Prospers 
by John E. McKendrick plaintiff's viewpoint, and Sidney P. Gislason of New 
Ulm, taking the side of the defendant, gave a talk on 
the art of the closing argument. 
William Mitchell's fourth year moot court course 
is nearing completion of its most successful year. Again 
under the direction of the Hon. Ronald E. Hachey 
and Attorney Robert W. Gislason, the program has 
offered an impressive succession of lectures, demon-
strations, and other contacts with members of the 
practicing bar and judiciary. All have been aimed at 
encouraging individual participation of each student 
in the course. 
Foremost of a number of innovations was the pre-
sentation of a criminal appeal by four William 
Mitchell seniors to the Minnesota Supreme Court, 
which heard oral arguments sitting en bane. The four, 
Sam Hanson and John F . Kelly representing defend-
ant-appellant, Allan E. Mulligan and Gary Phleger 
arguing on behalf of the State, were selected by their 
classmates to make the trip to the State Capitol. 
Later in the fall semester, Minnesota's two youngest 
Supreme Court Justices, Robert Sheran and Walter 
Rogosheske, presented a highly informative discourse 
on "practice and procedure in preparing for an ap-
peal." Immediately after the Christmas recess, a final 
lecture was given by law partners John A. Cochrane 
and Douglas W. Thompson on changing facets in the 
law as applied to the criminal defendant. 
The appeal was particularly noteworthy in that its 
special fact situation was contrived by John A. Coch-
rane, prominent St. Paul criminal defense attorney and 
alumnus of William Mitchell. In drafting the facts, 
special pains were taken to raise many of the vital 
issues in the areas of criminal procedure and consti-
tutional due process which are currently perplexing 
courts all over the land. Because the Minnesota Su-
preme Court has not yet passed on many of these is-
sues, the appeal assumed added significance. 
Highlighting the second semester _was the demon-
stration of a tax fraud case in the courtroom of Judge 
Edward Devitt of the U.S. District Court. It was 
the first time such a project had been undertaken 
in the moot court program. Acting out the case for 
the government was U.S. District Attorney Miles 
Lord, while the taxpayer was represented by Hyam 
Segal. The many hours of preparation volunteered by 
these men, and by numerous government attorneys 
who acted as witnesses, contributed greatly to the 
success of the endeavor. 
On dates subsequent to the federal court demon-
stration, the students heard instructive lectures from 
John E. Peters, head of the Hennepin County Tor-
ens Office, who spoke on "procedure in registering 
land," and Judge Archie Gingold and Referees Eugene 
Burns and Charles O'Connell of the Ramsey County 
Juvenile Court, who described the peculiar problems 
in handling juvenile cases. Earl Parker, Deputy Clerk 
of Court of Hennepin County and Ray Lerschen, ex-
court reporter, split a session in late spring to speak 
on various aspects of their jobs. 
Staggered betweeu an appeal and the two practice 
trials which each tudent was required to prepare dur-
ing the course of the year was a series of discussion-
lectures. Without exception, each of these sessions 
was characterized by an abundance of "give-and-take" 
between the participants and the students. The re-
sult was the dissemination of practical information 
which, to a large extent, is unobtainable through the 
use of books. 
The fall sessions were directed primarily at the 
"how-to" aspects of trying a lawsuit. Several of the 
state's top trial lawyers participated. In one session, 
Jerre Logan of St. Paul's Tyrrell, Jardine, Logan & 
O'Brien and Robert J. King of the Minneapolis firm 
of Hvass, Weisman & King led a question-answer dis-
cussion on both the defendant and plaintiff aspects of 
presenting a case for trial. In a second session, Wil-
liam H. DeParcq of Minneapolis, representing the 
Further supplementing the professional atmosphere 
which has pervaded the moot court program was the 
large array of Twin City judges and attorneys who 
took their turns as judges at the students' practice 
trials. 
Bob Rahn Wins 
National Mention 
In ASCAP Contest 
by Gary Phleger 
Bob Rahn, William Mitchell Sen-
ior who last October won the 
$250 first prize in the 1964 Nathan 
Burkan Memorial Competition at 
Mitchell, has just been notified that 
his paper was selected by the 1964 
National Panel of Judges on March 
22 for one of five "Special Mention" 
citations. 
In commenting 
on the distinction, 
Judge Carl Mc-
Gowan, U.S. Court 
of Appeals, Dis-
trict of Columbia 
and panel member 
remarked that 
"These were pa-
Bob Rahn pers of high merit 
relating to sub-
jects of a specialized nature .. . " 
Stanley Adams, president of the 
American Society of Composers, 
Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) 
had announced in October that Mr. 
Rahn's paper entitled "Copyright-
ing of Insurance Rate Manuals: 
Protection or Monopoly" was se-
lected for the cash award as winner 
f;om William Mitchell. 
While at Mitchell Mr. Rahn has 
served as Student Bar Association 
Representative and Treasurer, and 
as editor of the William Mitchell 
Opinion. He received a Bachelor of 
Science in Fire Protection and Safe-
ty Engineering from the Illinois In-
stitute of Technology in 1954. 
Mr. Rahn resides in Edina, Min-
nesota with his six children and 
wife, Patricia. He is employed by 
the Fire Underwriters Inspection 
Bureau in Minneapolis and hopes 
to enter a profession combining his 
legal, insurance and engineering 
training. 
In co-ordinating the varied facets of this year's 
moot court program, Judge Hachey and Bob Gislason 
were understandably gratified by the "continued un-
selfish attitude of the practicing Bar and Judiciary, 
who gave so freely of their time." But as also noted 
by both, "the accelerated interest and participation 
of the graduating seniors made improvement inevit-
able." 
OUTLAW . .. ( Continued from page 4) 
igation leads to chaos; that 
certainty in legal relations must 
he maintained; that after a 
party has had his day in court, 
justice, expediency and the 
preservation of public tran-
quility requires the matter be 
at an end."' 
The same Court of Appeals, in a 
dispute involving land in the St. 
Louis River between Minnesota and 
Wisconsin, in 1913 was almost con-
fronted with the same question as 
presented in Duke, but the conclu-
sion on the merits in that case made 
a jurisdictional decision unneces-
sary .26 Yet, Minnesota's Supreme 
Court has held--contrary to the old 
English rule•• and still the majority 
rule today-that an action will lie 
in Minnesota to recover damages 
for injuries to land situated in an-
other state. 
That was decided in Little v. Chi-
cago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and 
Omaha Railway Co.,Z, where Justice 
Mitchell said: 
• . . An action for damages 
to real property is on principle 
just as transitory in its nature 
as one on contract or for a 
tort c0D1D1itted on the person 
or personal property. The rep-
aration is purely personal, and 
for damages. Such an action is 
purely personal, and in no 
sense real."' 
Although jurisdiction in the Lit-
tle case was held to be personal, 
courts can-in reality-affect title 
to land in other states. For example, 
if the court has jurisdiction of the 
owner, he is ordered to execute a 
conveyance of the land, and does so 
to avoid contempt of court, it has 
been held that such a deed is effec-
tive to pass title to foreign land.2° 
This situation was carried ·one 
step further in Fall v. Eastin,"' 
where a Washington state court or-
dered the conveyance of Nebraska 
land and the plaintiff then brought 
an action in the Nebraska courts to 
quiet title. The Supreme Court, 
however, held that the plaintiff had 
misconceived her remedy in the Ne-
braska courts, but it almost certain-
ly did not hold that Nebraska was 
not required by full faith and credit 
to give res judicata effect to the 
Washington decree. 
The Duke decision, it can be ar-
gued, is really a judicial detour to 
circle historical roadblocks that Jus-
tice Mitchell pushed out of his way 
in the Little case. 
If that is true and if changing 
conditions are causing the policy of 
denying jurisdiction of foreign lands 
to lose some of its strength, a Min-
nesotan who chooses to litigate in 
Nebraska the title to his Minnesota 
land should have as much right to 
do so as to litigate the title to an 
automobile, which Minnesota also 
registers and derives some financial 
benefit from in license fees, but 
which the Minnesotan could also 
take into the jurisdiction of the 
Nebraska court. 
All that such a land decree could 
hold is that as against each other 
and those in privity with them ei-
ther the plaintiff or defendant is 
entitled to the land.:n Such a decree 
could not bind the situs state since 
it was not a party to the suit. 
Therefore, even if that state were 
compelled to give the decree its res 
judicata effect, there would be noth-
ing to prevent- it from subsequently 
ousting the successful party from 
the land if such possession on his 
part were contrary to its law. 
Even without this argument, the 
Duke and Schroeder opinions-by 
their emphasis on putting an end to 
litigation-indicate a strong policy 
consideration for allowing a defen-
dant to litigate the title to his land 
in a foreign state, if he chooses to 
do so and no statute stands in his 
Senior Sam Hanson to 
Serve Justice Slieran 
By Lee FossUin 
After a privileged work record those issues. He will reduce the re,. 
and a stand-out academic career, suits to memorandum form for the 
senior Sam Hanson's own special Justice being served. Sam will also 
charisma has earned him an ap- participate in the discussions in 
pointment to serve as law clerk for which opinions are formulated by 
Minnesota Supreme Court Justice the Justices, and will assist to a de-
Robert J. Sheran from August 1, gree in the drafting of those opin-
1965 to July 1, 1966. ions. 
Sam Hanson 
Each of the seven justices on the 
Supreme Court employs a recent 
law school graduate as law clerk, 
the clerkship generally to be served 
immediately following graduation. 
Mr. Hanson earned a B .. \. degree 
in history and economics from St. 
Olaf college in 1961. His experience 
while attending William Mitchell 
College of Law has been what every 
night law school advocate dreams 
of-a broad and meaningful work 
program related to the legal profes-
sion, combined with a rigorous for-
mal legal education through class-
room instruction. 
Sam is presently employed as law 
clerk for Judge Douglas K. Amdahl 
of the Hennepin County District 
Court. He was previously librarian 
Sam's duties as law clerk will in- in the Court of Appeals Library and 
elude studying the records and prior to that had been Deputy Clerk 
briefs of all cases under review to of District Court and Realty As-
isolate the issues for consideration, sistant for the Department of In-
and doing preliminary research on terior. 
Dance, Style Show . 
Law Wives Work Pays Off 
1965 was a vintage year for Wil-
liam Mitchell law wives, under the 
leadership of President Mrs. Don R. 
Sjostrom. 
The organization concentrated its 
efforts on two events to raise money 
for the Law Wives Scholarship 
Fund. The first of these events was 
the annual dance on which Chair-
man Mrs. Patrick O'Neill and her 
ticket chairman, Mrs . C. J . Com-
mers and Mrs. Richard R. Solie re-
ported a profit of $250. 
The other money raising event 
was the annual style show. Under 
the direction of Mrs. Asa Buttrick, 
chairman, her ticket chairmen Mrs. 
Ronald E. Erickson and Mrs. Jer-
ome T. Anderson, this year's show 
drew a capacity crowd of 500 at the 
Thunderbird Motor Hotel. A grand 
total of $325, a $150 increase over 
1964 profits, was added to the schol-
arship fund. 
A special introductory course in 
law for law wives was taught this 
year for the first time and was 
very successful thanks to the efforts 
of Mrs. Phil A. Gartner and her 
committee. The class was taught 
by Dean Heidenreich. It was open 
to wives of Alumni as well as wives 
of students. An additional scholar-
ship of $200 will be offered next 
way,32 and be bound by the foreign 
court's determination. He would be 
treated fairly because he is appear-
ing by choice or because he is within 
the jurisdiction of the court, and he 
would not be bound if he did not 
appear. There might be exceptions, 
however, because interests of the 
state or convenience in certain cases 
might outweigh the interest of the 
litigants in choosing their own for-
um. Generally, it would seem that 
convenience and what interest the 
state does have would best be 
served by litigation of title in the 
state in which the land is situated. 
However, the Duke and Schroe-
der cases are portraits of judicial 
scenes in which it would be unfair 
to allow a litigant to seek his rem-
edy in one state and then not be 
bound by it if it fails to suit his 
taste. To that extent, these two 
cases indicate the continuation of a 
jurisdictional trend that could move 
the courts' power over land in many 
year by law wives as a result of 
profits from the class. 
Law wives undertook to become 
more involved in their charity proj-
ect this year. April 10 they gave an 
Easter party for 60 children at 
Shriners' Hospital. Mrs. D. Wayne 
Snyder, chairman of the project, 
arranged for entertainment, favors 
and a guest appearance by a local 
children's TV celebrity. 
Final stages are being reached in 
the planning of the Junior-Senior 
party. This event which is given 
annually by Junior Wives for all 
Seniors, their wives and parents 
will be held June 11. Mrs. Phil A. 
Gartner heads this event. 
A banquet April 28 at Edgewater 
Inn marks the end of a very exciting 
first season of league bowling for 
law wives. 
And now instead of taking a 
breather, law wives will work all 
summer on a new project to raise 
money for the William Mitchell Law 
Wives Scholarship Fund. Mrs. John 
L. Frost, Mrs. Donald L. Anderson 
and Mrs. Eugene R. Ouradnik will 
work with other law wives to com-
pile The Law Wives Cookbook 
which will be published in the fall. 
It is estimated that net proceeds 
from the sale of the book will reach 
$1,000. 
cases to a basis closer to that of 
personal jurisdiction. 
!!3 308 F.2d at 219-220. A ccord, Hunting-
ton v. Attrill , HU U . . 65T ( l 92) . "'Pro-
ceed lairs in rem to determine ttie title to 
lo.nd must n ecessarily be brought in the. 
to.t,:, ,,.;tbia whose border th.e land j -
sJtonted. and whose courts and officers 
aloue can put the party in possession." 
"'318 F.2d 311. 
25 Whiteside v. Norton. 204 F. 5 (8th 
Cir. 1013) . cert. d enied. 282 U . • i20; ap-
fu,at di!rni.isscd. 239 u _ . J ~. 
"" Little , . Chicago, t. Paul. Minneapo-
lis and Orne.ha Rallwny Co .• 65 Minn . .rs. 
07 N .W . B16 (l 9U ) . Jll!lticc Mitchell stated 
the old English rule this way: "".As an In· 
jury to land can only oo committed wbcre 
the lo.nd lies, It followed U,n.t. a ccording 
to tbl test. action~ fur such iojuries were 
held to be local." 
27 Ibid. 
:,s Ibid. 
20 Deschenes v. Tallman , 248 N.Y. 33, 
161 N .E. 321 (1928). 
oo 21;; ti.S. 1 (1900) . 
a1 Reese, Full Falt h and Credit to For-
eign Equ ity Decrees, -4 2 Iowa L. Rev. 183, 
200 ( lU5i ) . 
~ Sanders v. :Pa.clflc Gn/!1ble Robin.son 
C.,1., ~50 i\Un n. 2~li. 4 ~ .'\\ .~d 010 (19~, ). . 
1n a bint that lack o! a statute might 
rnu.ke f orclgn ji;1rlsdlction more palata.ble, 
U1e MID:nesola upreme Court held in tb!S 
case that n stote con e.'<ercise Jurisdlction 
through its courts to direct II p_arty- sub-
ject w the jurisdiction of the court t<;> do 
an net in nnother state pro.-lded trurt 
such an act is not contrary to Lbe Jaw 
of the stn te in wh.leh it u; to be performed. 
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ALUMNI NEWS 
1917 
CHARLES J. HEMMINGTON, 83, 
Kittson County judge of probate for 
more than 15 years, died at Hallock, 
Minn. 
Mr. Hemmington was born in the 
Hallock area and was a member of 
the first graduating class at Hallock 
High School. From 1917 to 1920, he 
served as county auditor for Kittson 
County. He then practiced law at 
Hallock and later was named to the 
judgeship he held at the time of his 
death. 
He was a longtime Hallock School 
Board member and had served as 
treasurer of the board. He was also 
an officer of the Presbyterian 
Church at Hallock and an officer of 
several district organizations of his 
Church. 
Mr. Hemmington had been re-
elected to his county office in No-
vember . 
1919 
A. I. LEVIN, 72, St. Paul, died 
September 30, 1964. Mr. Levin prac-
ticed law in St. Paul for 45 years. 
He resided at 1732 Pinehurst Ave., 
St. Paul. 
Mr. Levin was born in St. Paul 
on the spot where the Court House 
now stands. He worked as an office 
boy in a law office while at school. 
Mr. Levin was a graduate of the 
University of Minnesota. Upon his 
admission to the Bar, he worked as 
Deputy Clerk of Probate Court un-
til he entered private practice in 
1921. For the past thirteen years he 
was associated with his son, Albert 
Levin, as the senior partner. 
1924 
a member of Burroughs Elementary 
School P.T.A. Mr. Anderson and 
family live at 4919 Colfax Ave. S., 
Minneapolis. 
1943 
RICHARD J. PARISH 1s the 
State Senator from 
the 30th District. 
He was first elect-
ed to the senate 
in 1963; before 
that he was a 
state representa-
tive, 1959-1963. 
He is past mem-
ber of the Metropolitan Planning 
Commission and first president of 
the Metropolitan Suburban School 
Board Association. In 1935 he re-
ceived a B.A. from Hamline Uni-
versity. 
1953 
THEODORE J. SANDHOEFNER, 
37, Claims Attorney for Casualty 
Underwriters of St. Paul, died Sept. 
14, 1964, of cancer after an illness 
of six months. He was born and 
lived in St. Paul until 8 years ago 
when he moved to White Bear Lake. 
Mr. Sandhoefner served in the U .S. 
Navy Submarine Service during 
World War II. 
1956 
RAYMOND PAVLAK was elected 
to represent the 
13th District 
North in the State 
Legislature. He is 
practicing law in 
South St. Paul 
and is a graduate 
of St. Thomas 
College. He lives 
Ave. No., South St. 
1957 
F. GORDON WRIGHT was re- at 1023 16th 
elected to the Minnesota House of Paul. 
Representatives. He has been the 
State Representative from the 36th JACK D eVAUGHN is practicing 
District since 1955. Mr. Wright is law in M inneapolis. Eis business ad-
a member of the law firm of Wright, dress is 1625 Park Ave. 
Storlie & Wanglie, Minneapolis. A DANIEL B. GALLAGHER has ac-
member of the Canadian Army for cepted a position as an attorney 
five years, he is chairman, U.S. Na- with the Minnesota State Industrial 
tional Council, Canadian Legion. Commission. He was formerly in 
From 1945 to 1954 he was chair- practice at Waseca, Minnesota, and 
man of the Legislative Committee was a Waseca municipal court 
of the Minnesota State Bar Asso- judge. 
ciation. He is also director of the 
Minnesota Society for the Preven-
tion of Blindness. His address is 
2912 Chowen Ave. So., Minneapo-
lis. 
1926 
J. NORMAN PETERSON is the 
Judge of Probate and Juvenile 
Court at Long Prairie, Minnesota. 
1934 
GERALD E. CARLSON an-
nounces that Donald F. Giblin 
(1964) has become associated with 
him in the practice of law at 32 
East Moreland Avenue, West St. 
Paul, Minnesota. 
1935 
HAROLD J. ANDERSON has 
been representing the 37th District 
in the State Legislature since 1951. 
He is a member of the Minneapo-
lis law firm of Anderson, LeVander, 
Zimpfer, Monson & Tierney. From 
1942 to 1946, he was a special agent 
for the F.B.I. He is also presently 
oon "ON wma.1 
·uumr 'tm•.i l«!"S 
1959 
ERNEST A. BEEDLE, State Rep-
resentative, is rep-
resenting the 46th 
District South. He 
is a member of 
the Beedle Law 
Firm, 221 Grand 
Ave., West St. 
Paul. Mr. and 
Mrs . Beedle and 
their two children reside at 868 
Delaware, St. Paul. 
KENNETH E. SCOTT represents 
the 10th District in the Minnesota 
House. A former claims examiner 
for the Agricultural Insurance 
Group, he is presently practicing 
law in Fairmont, Minnesota. His 
home address is 303 Woodland Ave., 
Fairmont. 
1960 
PIDLIP J. BLOEDEL has re-
signed as an assistant Hennepin 
County attorney to go into private 
practice. He was assigned to the 
SOISS 'UUJW 'JRIIJ 'IS 
·aAy l!UfflDlS OOIZ 
OIVd 
anv LSOd ·s· n 
·.l!JO l!JO.I.I-UON 
M.t?'} JO ajauoJ naqal!W UIB!IHA\ 
JO 
U0!18p088V .mg 1U.lpD1S .ll{J, 
criminal division of the county at-
torney's staff. Bloedel was former-
ly a corporation attorney. 
GARRY W. FLAKNE was re-
is 4901 




35th District. He 
is engaged in gen-
. era! law practice 
in Minneapolis. 
His home address 
11th Ave. So., Minneapolis. 
1961 
WILLIAl\1 SCHINDLER, present-
ly practicin law in Jackson, Minne-
sota, will be taking over the law 
practice of LaMont Seifert at Wells. 
He received a Bachelor of Arts De-
gree in Philosophy from the St. 
Paul Seminary. 
ROBERT H. MEIER has become 
a member of the General Counsel's 
Staff of the American Medical As-
sociation, 535 N. Dearborn Street 
Chicago. He is assigned to the De~ 
partment of Investigation and will 
be re ponsible for th inve tigation 
of He~1 lth Fraud and Quackery . 
His new home addt - i .J.O Elm 
Street, Glen Ellyn, Illinois. He was 
formerly a member of the Chief 
Attorney's Staff, V.A. Center at 
Fort Snelling. 
1962 
R ONALD THOMAS was recently 
appointed t o the Hennepin County 
attorney's office as an assistant 
county attorney assigned to the 
Domestic Relations Unit. 
1963 
WILLIAM N. BERNARD has 
joined the Willmar, Minnesota law 
firm of Davis & Strauman. He was 
forme_rly employed as contract man-
ager for the Univac Division of 
Sperry Rand Corporation. 
1964 
JAMES D. GIBBS announces that 
he is in the private practice of law 
in association with Ward P . Gron-
field. The offices are located at 556 
40th Ave. N.E., Columbia Heights, 
Minnesota . 
RONALD R. FRAUENSHUH has 
joined Rainer L. Weis in the prac-
tice of law at Paynesville, Minne-
sota. The firm will be known as 
Weis & Frauenshuh. 
RICHARD ARVOLD has become 
associated with K. L. 
Alexandria, Minnesota. 
Wallace at 
PERRY L. WILLIAMS, formerly 
with Mordaunt, Walstad, Cousin-
eau & McGuire, announced his as-
sociation with Richard Dobis under 
the firm name of Dobis & Williams. 
Their new offices are located at 3984 
Central Avenue N.E., Columbia 
Heights, Minnesota. 
RONALD J. McGRAW has joined 
the law firm of Donald Comer in 
Hutchinson, Minnesota. 
RICHARD F. NITZ has become 
associated with the firm of Polking-
horn, Williams & Nelson. The firm 
maintains offices in Fergus Falls 
and Pelican Rapids. 
JAMES TSCHIDA is with the 
Minnesota Attorney General's staff 
as a special assistant. 
1 
ARTHUR F. BLAUFUSS, form-
erly residing in St. Paul, has be-
come associated in the firm known 
as Meehl, Wiltrout & Franta with 
law offices at 305 North 2nd. St., 
Marshall. The new firm will be 
known as Meehl, Wiltrout, Franta 
& Blaufuss. He was employed for 
the last four years as a claimsman 
for Main & Baker Co., in Minne-
apolis. 
PATRICK S. LEARY is practicing 
law in Marshall with the firm of 
Quarnstrom & Doering. He was 
formerly with State Farm Insur-
ance Co. 
Religion/Gov'L cused on the basis of her religious 
freedom. 
(Continued from page 3) The standards set by the Supreme 
of religion. The Supreme Court did Court in the Barnette case and re-
not write an opinion but rather stated by the United States District 
merely cited the Sherbert case as Court in Arizona in the Sheldon 
controlling. Following the reasoning case have for the most part been 
of the Sherbert case, it seems that extended rather than limited. One 
the United States Supreme Court exception to this statement is the 
was convinced that there was no decisions on the Sunday closing laws. 
showing in the jury case that ex- It is indeed difficult to distinguish 
cusing the woman from jury serv- between the Braunfeld case and the 
ice would pose any practical hard- Sherbert case. The citizen in each 
ship on the state. There was no case is asked to choose between his 
evidence that this new-found right livelihood and his religious beliefs. 
(not to have to serve on juries) In the Sunday closing case the citi-
would be used (or abused) by citi- zen is asking only for a chance to 
zens to an extent that would ham- earn his own living. In the unem-
i:er the jury system as a whole. The ployment compensation case, the 
rationale of these cases shows the citizen refused to take a job which 
great difference in approach by the would force her to violate her re-
court since the Gobitis decision. In ligious dictates, and she further 
that case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter asks the state to support her in the 
looked to the broad overall interest way of statutory benefits. If the 
of the state. He felt the interest of cases are to be distinguished it 
the state was the ultimate interest must be on the basis of the at-
of national unity and security. Had titude of the court toward the in-
the court now wanted to look to the terest of the state. The result if 
broad interests they would have the retail merchants were to remain 
considered the jury system as a open on Sunday would be to destroy 
whole and the duties of citizens that one of the good effects the statute 
go hand in hand with the rights was intended to create. The over-
guaranteed by the constitution. all relaxed, non-commercial atmo-
These, however, were not the in- sphere of the day of rest would be 
terests to be considered by the court. gone. The court is thus considering 
The Supreme Court rather seems to the present practical effect as the 
want the state to look at what will interest of the state, and since this 
be the practical effect if this woman would be impaired by allowing the 
has her way. The interest of the retail stores to remain open, the 
government to be considered is right to free exercise of religion 
whether there is going to be any par- must in this situation be secondary 
ticular immediate hardship on the to the peace and good order of the 
trial system if this woman is ex- society. 
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